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T
he placebo effect is a 
fascinating yet puzzling 
phenomenon, which has 
challenged investigators over the past 
50 years. Recently, it has been deﬁ  ned 
as the “positive physiological or 
psychological changes associated with 
the use of inert medications, sham 
procedures, or therapeutic symbols 
within a healthcare encounter” [1]. 
Increasing scientiﬁ  c inquiry has been 
aimed at elucidating the mechanisms 
responsible for placebo effects and 
determining how inert interventions 
can lead to positive changes in 
patients [1,2]. The majority of placebo 
mechanism research has been done 
within the context of experimental 
and clinical pain. 
Patients’ expectations for 
improvement, also referred to as 
“response expectancies,” are thought 
to be one of the central mechanisms 
responsible for placebo effects 
[3–5]. Brain imaging techniques 
are being used to explore both the 
neurophysiological correlates of these 
expectations and the mechanisms 
underlying placebo effects in a 
variety of contexts, including pain 
relief in healthy participants, relief of 
symptoms of depression, and motor 
functioning in patients with Parkinson 
disease [6–8]. Understanding these 
mechanisms is an important step 
in harnessing the placebo effect 
in patient care. In the words of a 
National Institutes of Health request 
for applications, “understanding how 
to enhance the therapeutic beneﬁ  ts of 
placebo effect in clinical practice has 
the potential to signiﬁ  cantly improve 
healthcare” [9]. Toward that end, the 
National Institutes of Health invited 
submissions for systematic studies 
aimed at discerning the psychosocial 
factors (including expectancy) in the 
patient–clinician relationship and/or 
in the health-care environment that 
can potentiate healing.
A common feature of 
research investigating 
the placebo effect is 
deception of research 
participants about the 
nature of the research. 
This use of deception 
is considered necessary 
to understanding the 
placebo effect, but has 
received little systematic 
ethical attention. In 
this article, we examine 
ethical issues relating to 
deception in research 
on the placebo effect, 
with a particular focus on 
experiments involving 
patients in clinical 
settings. We propose a 
method of informing 
participants about the 
use of deception that can 
reconcile the scientiﬁ  c 
need for deceptive 
research designs with 
the ethical requirements for clinical 
research.
Altering Expectations to Examine 
Placebo Mechanisms 
Response expectancy is seen to 
be a major driving force behind 
the placebo effect. Therefore, a 
common (and some would argue, 
necessary) feature of research aimed 
at elucidating placebo mechanisms is 
the use of deception in experimental 
manipulation of participants’ 
expectations (e.g., about whether or 
not they will receive a “powerful pain 
killer” or a “sugar pill”), while holding 
constant the pharmacological (or 
other) properties of the administered 
intervention. This research has clearly 
shown (across a wide range of clinical 
conditions) that altering expectancies 
for improvement has an impact on 
therapeutic outcomes [8,10–13]. 
The tension between scientiﬁ  c 
methods for elucidating the placebo 
effect and ethical norms for conducting  
research involving human participants is 
illustrated most clearly by “the balanced 
placebo design,” an approach designed 
to disentangle the relative effects of 
pharmacology and response expectancy. 
Table 1 displays the balanced placebo 
design in a way that highlights the 
deception of participants that occurs in 
two of the four arms of the design.
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In the balanced placebo design, 
investigators manipulate both 
expectancies (e.g., informing 
participants that they will receive 
a drug versus informing them that 
they will receive placebo) and the 
pharmacological agent (giving a drug 
versus giving a placebo). As reviewed 
by Swartzman and Burkell, researchers 
using this paradigm with healthy 
volunteers have shown that expectation 
plays a role in the subjective and 
behavioral effects of a range of 
psychoactive substances [14]. These 
substances include dexamfetamine, 
alcohol, caffeine, nicotine, and 
tetrahydrocannabinol [15–19]. 
The balanced placebo design offers 
a powerful and elegant approach to 
evaluate drug versus expectancy effects 
and their interactions. As Kirsch notes, 
this design yields information that 
cannot be obtained from conventional 
clinical trials [20]. It provides a 
direct assessment of the drug effect, 
independent of expectancy, and 
the nondeceptive arms are more 
ecologically valid than the double-
blind administration in conventional 
randomized trials (i.e., they mimic what 
goes on in the real world of clinical 
practice). Thus, it is not surprising 
that Caspi recently suggested that the 
balanced placebo design “be used more 
often in clinical trials of drug efﬁ  cacy” 
[21]. Despite the methodological 
virtues of the balanced placebo design, 
and its prior use in healthy volunteers, 
we are unaware of any trials that have 
employed this approach with patients. 
Clinical investigators likely have 
avoided use of the balanced placebo 
design out of concern for the ethical 
acceptability of deceiving patients. 
An often cited article on the 
balanced placebo design characterized 
the deception in the following way: 
“Although deception is involved, it 
is no greater than is involved in any 
study using placebos” [22]. However, 
this defense of the balanced placebo 
design confuses the ethical issues it 
raises. Placebo-controlled trials aimed 
at evaluating the efﬁ  cacy of treatments 
may be regarded as having an element 
of deception, since the placebo control 
is designed to appear indistinguishable 
from the active treatment under 
investigation. Nevertheless, when these 
studies are conducted under effective 
double-blind conditions, participants 
are told that they will receive either 
a drug or a placebo, and neither 
the investigators nor the research 
participants know which intervention 
is received by any of the participants. 
Accordingly, administering the 
study interventions, unlike the 
situation of the balanced placebo 
design, does not involve intentionally 
false communication; it requires 
investigators to withhold information, 
but not to lie to participants about the 
interventions they will receive. 
Research designed to understand 
the placebo effect by deceptively 
manipulating the expectations of 
participants holds great promise for 
understanding the psychological 
and neurobiological dimensions of 
healing. However, to pursue this 
research while respecting participants, 
it is necessary to develop an approach 
that reconciles the outright deception 
involved in placebo research, including 
the balanced placebo design, with 
the ethical norms governing clinical 
research.
What Makes Deception in 
Scientiﬁ  c Investigation Ethically 
Problematic?
At the outset, it is useful to appreciate 
the conﬂ  ict between the ethos of 
science and the use of deceptive 
techniques. Science aims to discover 
and communicate the truth about the 
natural world and human conduct. 
There are sound methodological 
reasons for using deception to probe 
for the truth about human attitudes 
and beliefs and their effects on 
behavior. It follows, however, that when 
deception is used, a conﬂ  ict between 
the means and ends of scientiﬁ  c 
investigation ensues: the end of 
discovering the truth is pursued by the 
means of deliberate untruth. 
It might be argued that deception 
in scientiﬁ  c investigation is no more 
problematic than the pervasive and 
accepted use of deception in daily life 
and in social contexts [23]. In a recent 
news article reporting advances in 
the design of computers to simulate 
human responsiveness, Clifford 
Nass, a professor of communication 
at Stanford University, endorses the 
deception involved in this project: 
“We spend enormous amounts of time 
teaching children to deceive—it’s 
called being polite or social. The 
history of all advertising is about 
deceiving. In education, it’s often 
important to deceive people—
sometimes you say, ‘Boy you are really 
doing good,’ not because you meant 
it but because you thought it would be 
helpful” [24]. 
Deception in ordinary life typically 
is justiﬁ  ed on the grounds that it is 
for the beneﬁ  t of the individual who 
is being deceived. For instance, the 
polite and social deception that Nass 
cites is justiﬁ  ed on the grounds that it is 
better to deceive someone slightly than 
to criticize the person or to hurt the 
person’s feelings. Notice, however, that 
this condition is not relevant to placebo 
research, including the balanced 
placebo design. In placebo research, 
participants are not deceived for their 
own beneﬁ  t. Rather, they are deceived 
for the beneﬁ  t of science and society in 
general, through the development of 
generalizable knowledge.
Deception of research participants 
also clearly conﬂ  icts with the ethical 
norms governing clinical research 
[25,26]. First, it violates the principle 
of respect for persons by infringing 
on the right of prospective research 
participants to choose whether to 
participate in research based on full 
disclosure of relevant information. 
Second, it may manipulate individuals 
When deception is used, 
a conﬂ  ict between the 
means and ends of 
scientiﬁ  c investigation 
ensues.
Table 1. The Balanced Placebo Design 
What Participants Are Told What Participants Receive
Participants Given Drug Participants Given Placebo
Participants told they will receive 
drug
True (no deception) False (deception)
Participants told they will receive 
placebo
False (deception) True (no deception)
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020262.t001
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to volunteer when they otherwise would 
not have chosen to do so had they been 
informed accurately about the nature 
of the research, including its use of 
deception. For these reasons, deception, 
as it is currently practiced in the conduct 
of research on the placebo effect, is 
incompatible with informed consent.
Third, although scant systematic 
data have been collected on the effects 
of deception on clinical research 
participants, some available evidence 
indicates that when the deception 
is revealed, as in the debrieﬁ  ng 
process that often accompanies 
deceptive research, it causes distress 
to at least some participants [27]. 
The adverse impact of deception in 
psychological research, and whether 
it can be reversed adequately through 
a debrieﬁ  ng process, is a subject 
of debate [28–31]. Furthermore, 
deception in research involving patients 
in clinical settings may prove more 
upsetting. This is because participants 
in deceptive psychological research 
are, for the most part, psychology 
undergraduates who often are aware 
that deception is sometimes used in 
psychological research [32]. Patients, 
in contrast, legitimately expect to be 
able to trust in, and receive truthful 
communication from, clinicians 
and clinical investigators. This trust 
is violated by the use of deception. 
Especially problematic is the use of 
deception in experiments conducted by 
clinicians who have a prior clinician–
patient relationship with the patients 
enrolled in the study. When patients 
learn about the use of deception in 
the process of debrieﬁ  ng, which is a 
common feature of deception research, 
they may feel that their trust has been 
violated. Consequently, deception of 
patients may have deleterious effects on 
the willingness of patients to volunteer 
for future clinical research. More 
importantly, by undermining patients’ 
faith in the truthfulness of physicians, 
deception might interfere with the 
future medical care of those who have 
experienced deceptive research. 
Finally, deception in research raises 
ethical concern because it can be 
corrupting for the professionals who 
practice it, and for those who witness 
it. According to an ancient perspective 
in moral philosophy, moral character 
depends on habits of conduct [33]. 
The use of deception in research may 
interfere with the disposition not to 
lie or deceive persons. This problem 
is compounded when the study design 
requires deception at the initiation of 
the trial as well as repeated deception 
of participants while conducting 
the research. Those who witness 
deception, especially if performed 
or sanctioned by professionals in 
positions of authority, may develop 
skewed perceptions of the ethics of 
deception, which may have negative 
consequences for the development of 
moral character. In sum, deception in 
research is prima facie wrongful, and 
it may be harmful not only to those 
who are deceived but also to those who 
practice or witness it.
The American Psychological 
Association’s guidelines [34] are 
perhaps the most prominent attempt 
to reconcile the use of deception 
with the ethical norms of human 
participant research. According 
to guideline 8.07 (Deception in 
Research), “(a) psychologists do not 
conduct a study involving deception 
unless they have determined that 
the use of deceptive techniques is 
justiﬁ  ed by the study’s signiﬁ  cant 
prospective scientiﬁ  c, educational, 
or applied value and that effective 
nondeceptive alternative procedures 
are not feasible; (b) psychologists do 
not deceive prospective participants 
about research that is reasonably 
expected to cause physical pain 
or severe emotional distress; (c) 
psychologists explain any deception 
that is an integral feature of the 
design and conduct of an experiment 
to participants as early as is feasible, 
preferably at the conclusion of their 
participation, but no later than at the 
conclusion of the data collection, and 
permit participants to withdraw their 
data.”
We have argued elsewhere that these 
three conditions are not sufﬁ  cient to 
address the ethical concerns raised 
by deceptive research [25,26]. In 
particular, these conditions fail to 
address the fact that concealing the 
use of deception itself may affect 
individuals’ decision to participate in 
research and precludes individuals 
from deciding whether they want to 
participate in deceptive research. To be 
sure, the use of debrieﬁ  ng may mitigate 
the potential harmful consequences of 
deceitful communication by explaining 
the rationale for deception. However, 
just as compensation for damages 
caused by negligence or restitution for 
crime does not cancel an infringement 
of a person’s rights, debrieﬁ  ng 
does not cancel the violation of the 
principle of respect for persons. To 
consider how these ethical concerns 
arise in actual practice, and what steps 
might be taken to address them, it 
will be helpful to consider speciﬁ  c 
examples of the use of deception in 
placebo research (Table S1). 
Examples of Deception in Placebo 
Research
First, in an experiment investigating 
suggestion and expectation relating 
to placebo analgesia, 13 women 
with irritable bowel syndrome 
were recruited, and were subjected 
to visceral pain evoked by rectal 
distention, using a balloon attached 
to a rectal catheter. The experiment 
took place under ﬁ  ve experimental 
conditions: (1) natural history (no 
intervention relating to or disclosure 
about the pain stimulus), (2) rectal 
placebo (a sterile surgical lubricant 
placed on the balloon, described as 
effective in relieving pain), (3) rectal 
lidocaine, (4) oral lidocaine, and (5) 
rectal nocebo (a placebo intervention 
accompanied by a disclosure that the 
intervention often causes increased 
pain) [13]. Notably, the research report 
stated that “the gastroenterologist who 
performed the study was the doctor 
the patients normally consulted in the 
clinic.” 
The investigators described their 
disclosure to the participants as 
follows: “The patients were told that 
four drugs that reduced and increased 
pain in relation to IBS [irritable 
bowel syndrome], respectively, were 
being tested, and that they had been 
proven effective in preliminary studies” 
[13]. In reality, the participants were 
administered two different forms of 
only one drug, along with two placebos. 
Hence, the participants were deceived 
by being informed that they would 
receive drugs that in fact were placebo 
interventions. 
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Second, investigators recruited 
patients with asthma, from an academic 
medical center, to participate in an 
experiment examining changes in 
forced expiratory volume in one second 
following administration of inhaled 
saline described deceptively as either a 
bronchoconstrictor or a bronchodilator 
[12]. The purpose was to determine 
the impact of suggestion on a placebo 
intervention in patients identiﬁ  ed as 
suggestible or suggestion-resistant, 
based on a validated rating scale. The 
disclosure to the research participants 
was described in the article reporting 
the experimental results as follows: 
“Patients were contacted via telephone 
and informed that the investigators 
were hoping to understand how 
medications produce beneﬁ  cial effects 
in asthma, including whether telling 
subjects about the potential effects 
of various medications would alter 
response to these agents. Patients were 
not told that they would be exposed 
to placebo interventions.” The study 
thus used elaborate deception, which 
involved an inaccurate account of 
the nature of the research and false 
descriptions of a placebo intervention. 
It is therefore puzzling that the 
authors reported that “all patients 
gave informed consent to participate 
in the study,” especially since there 
was no indication that the participants 
were informed that deception would 
be employed. Instead, the participants 
were debriefed about the study at the 
end of the experiment.
Authorized Deception
Can deceptive research be made 
compatible with informed consent? 
Use of deception is not consistent with 
fully informed consent. If participants 
are told the true purpose of research 
and the nature of all procedures, there 
would be no deception. However, 
participants can be informed prior to 
deciding whether to volunteer for a 
study that the experimental procedures 
will not be described accurately or that 
some features of these procedures will 
or may be misleading or deceptive 
[25,26]. This approach, which we 
call “authorized deception,” permits 
research participants to decide whether 
they wish to participate in research 
involving deception and, if so, to 
knowingly authorize its use. Authorized 
deception is compatible with the 
spirit of informed consent. It fosters 
respect for persons, despite the use 
of deception, by alerting prospective 
participants to the fact that some or 
all participants will be deliberately 
deceived about the purpose of the 
research or the nature of research 
procedures.
For example, investigators using 
the balanced placebo design to study 
expectancy and pharmacological 
effects of dexamfetamine described 
the informed consent disclosure as 
follows: “For ethical reasons it was 
stated in the consent form that ‘…some 
information and/or instructions given 
[to the participant] may be inaccurate’” 
[15]. This statement recognizes the 
ethical force of authorized deception, 
but does not seem to go far enough. 
As illustrated above, the balanced 
placebo design involves lying to 
participants in two arms of the study: 
some participants are told that they 
are being administered a particular 
drug when in fact they receive placebo, 
and others that they are being 
administered placebo when in fact they 
receive the drug. Consequently, it is 
at best an understatement to describe 
the disclosure in this experiment 
as possibly involving “inaccurate” 
information. It would be more accurate 
to inform the prospective participants 
that some research participants will be 
misled or deceived. 
Variants of the authorized deception 
approach have been advocated, and 
sometimes evaluated experimentally, 
since the 1970s [23,35–37]; however, 
it has not become a routine feature 
of research using deception [38]. In 
order to solicit informed authorization 
for the use of deception, the informed 
consent document could be worded 
as follows: “You should be aware that 
the investigators have intentionally 
misdescribed certain aspects of 
the study. This use of deception is 
necessary to obtain valid results. 
However, an independent ethics 
committee has determined that this 
consent form accurately describes 
the major risks and beneﬁ  ts of the 
study. The investigator will explain the 
misdescribed aspects of the study to you 
at the end of your participation.” 
When deception of study participants 
is necessary and justiﬁ  ed by the 
scientiﬁ  c value of the study, the use 
of authorized deception makes 
the process of deceptive research 
transparent. Participants are informed 
that they will be misled or deceived, 
though obviously the exact nature of 
the deception cannot be disclosed. 
They are assured that the research has 
been reviewed and approved by an 
ethics oversight committee that has 
no vested interest in the research in 
question, and that no important risks, 
other than the risks of the deception 
itself, have been concealed. Finally, 
they are informed that debrieﬁ  ng will 
occur.
Methodological Objections and 
the Need for Future Study
One possible objection to the 
technique of authorized deception 
is that it is liable to defeat the 
purpose of using deception to obviate 
potentially biased responses of research 
participants to research interventions. 
Informing participants that deception 
will occur (particularly in a study that 
involves administration of a placebo) 
is apt to make them suspicious and 
wary, thus possibly contributing to 
biased data. This methodological risk 
is avoided in most deceptive research, 
which does not employ this technique, 
provided that prospective participants 
do not otherwise suspect that deception 
will be used. However, limited available 
research indicates that the anticipated 
biased results from disclosing the 
possibility of deception do not 
necessarily occur. 
Holmes and Bennett assessed 
this methodological concern 
experimentally. Psychology students 
were exposed to a deceptive 
experiment in which they were falsely 
informed that two to eight “painful 
electric shocks” would be administered 
at random times after a red signal light 
appeared [35]. No shocks actually 
were administered. Measures of self-
reported anxiety and physiological 
arousal (pulse and respiration rates) 
were obtained. Prior to the deceptive 
shock intervention, one experimental 
group was informed that deception 
is occasionally used in psychology 
experiments to assure unbiased 
responses. The other group exposed 
to the deceptive shock intervention 
did not receive any information 
September 2005  |  Volume 2  |  Issue 9  |  e262
Use of deception is not 
consistent with fully 
informed consent.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0857
about the possibility of deception. No 
outcome differences were observed for 
participants informed of the possibility 
of deception versus those not informed.
The information about deception 
in this experiment, however, falls 
short of the authorized deception 
approach that we recommend. It 
disclosed to prospective participants 
that deception is a possibility in 
“a few experiments,” rather than 
informing them that deception 
would actually be employed for all or 
some participants in the particular 
experiment in which they were invited 
to enroll. In contrast, Wiener and 
Erker directly tested the authorized 
deception approach, described as 
“prebrieﬁ  ng,” in an experiment 
evaluating attributions of responsibility 
for rape based on transcripts from an 
actual rape trial [37]. Participants (68 
undergraduate psychology students) 
were either correctly informed or 
misinformed about the jury verdict 
regarding the defendant’s guilt. Half 
of participants received an informed-
consent document stating that “you 
may be purposefully misinformed.” 
The other half was not alerted to the 
possibility of deception. No differences 
on attribution of responsibility were 
observed depending on whether or not 
the participants were prebriefed about 
the use of deception.
A second methodological objection 
to authorized deception is that it 
has the potential to reduce the 
comparability to previous research 
on placebo mechanisms that did not 
employ this technique. There is no way 
to avoid this problem. But to argue 
that consequently the authorized 
deception approach should not be 
adopted would suggest that past 
ethical lapses justify current ethically 
deﬁ  cient practice. Finally, disclosure 
of the use of deception may lead 
to reduced participant enrollment, 
making it more difﬁ  cult to complete 
valuable studies and possibly reducing 
their generalizability. At the extreme, 
it is possible that too few prospective 
participants will be willing to 
volunteer, especially for experiments 
recruiting patients. One clinical 
research study using the authorized 
deception approach (in this case, 
informing participants that details 
about the purpose of the research 
were withheld) found no substantial 
impact on enrollment [39]. This 
remains to be studied further. But 
if this approach reduces participant 
enrollment, it would indicate that 
eligible prospective participants do 
not wish to be deceived, casting doubts 
on the legitimacy of using deception 
without disclosing its use. 
The results of psychology 
experiments that alerted participants 
to the possibility of deception and 
used prebrieﬁ  ng are encouraging, 
but may not be generalizable to 
the situation of patients in clinical 
research. The null ﬁ  ndings obtained 
by Weiner and Erker and Holmes 
and Bennet need to be interpreted 
with caution [35,37]. Given that their 
study participants were psychology 
undergraduates, even those who 
were not prebriefed about the use of 
deception could have anticipated that 
they might be deceived [32].
Accordingly, the effects of the 
authorized deception approach on 
study outcomes merit investigation 
with respect to research on the 
placebo effect in a clinical setting. 
For example, a methodological 
experiment comparing the authorized 
deception approach to the traditional 
approach that does not reveal the use 
of deception might be attached to 
a study using the balanced placebo 
design to evaluate expectation effects 
relating to placebo analgesia among 
patients recovering from surgery. 
Patients would be randomized to 
the two methods of disclosure, 
which would be assessed in terms 
of their impact on reported pain 
relief among patients in the various 
arms of the underlying study. This 
would allow investigators to examine 
the extent to which the authorized 
deception approach biases the study 
outcomes. It might be desirable 
to conduct such a methodological 
experiment in connection with a 
diversity of underlying studies of the 
placebo effect and in various patient 
populations. 
We suspect that the use of authorized 
deception will not bias studies of the 
placebo effect. Hence, the results of 
such experiments have the potential 
to pave the way for important research 
to proceed that uses the balanced 
placebo design in the clinical setting 
along with the authorized deception 
approach—research that otherwise 
might be rejected by ethics review 
committees, owing to concerns about 
using deception in clinical research. 
If authorized deception does produce 
some bias, decisions will have to be 
made by investigators and ethics review 
committees about the importance of 
this bias in compromising the validity 
of the research compared to the 
importance of respecting the autonomy 
of research participants. Conducting 
studies to estimate the extent of the 
bias will facilitate and inform these 
decisions.
If the use of authorized deception 
proved to produce seriously biased 
results, then it might be argued that it 
would be unethical to use the balanced 
placebo design in clinical research, 
owing to the extensive deception 
involved. Nevertheless, some aspects of 
the role of expectancy in therapeutic 
responses could still be evaluated in an 
ethical manner by using nondeceptive 
research paradigms in clinical settings 
[20,40,41], such as comparing an 
open versus closed [10,42] or an open 
versus double-blind administration of 
a therapeutic agent [11]. The problem 
with these experimental paradigms, 
however, is that because they do not 
fully manipulate expectancy and 
pharmacology in a factorial design 
(as does the balanced placebo 
design), they do not permit a rigorous 
evaluation of drug versus expectancy 
effects and their interaction.
Remaining Qualms about 
Deceptive Research
Deceptive research involving patients in 
the clinical setting might be considered 
unethical even when all pertinent 
safeguards are in place, including 
the use of authorized deception. 
This is because deception, even if 
authorized in advance, violates the 
ethical framework of the clinician–
patient relationship, which is based on 
trust. It may be argued that clinician 
investigators who deceive patients 
in the course of research are acting 
fraudulently. Accordingly, professional 
ethics precludes participation in 
deceptive research. 
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This objection, however, confuses 
the ethics of clinical research with 
the ethics of medical care [43,44]. 
Clinical research aims at developing 
generalizable knowledge in order to 
improve medical care in the future. 
Promoting the medical best interests 
of particular patients is not part of the 
primary purpose of clinical research. 
Clinical research also departs from 
the ethics of medical care in the 
methods it uses, such as randomization, 
double-blind procedures, placebo 
controls, and the justiﬁ  cation of risks. 
Nearly all clinical research, especially 
research that is not aimed at evaluating 
the efﬁ  cacy or safety of treatment 
interventions, poses risks to participants 
that are not offset by potential medical 
beneﬁ  ts. Accordingly, the researcher 
is not functioning as a therapist in the 
context of clinical research. It follows 
that deceptive behavior that would 
be fraudulent in clinical practice is 
not necessarily unethical in clinical 
research. The informed-consent process 
should clarify that the research in 
question is different from and outside 
the purview of medical care. The use 
of authorized deception in this context 
makes research involving deception 
consistent with ethical guidelines 
appropriate to clinical research.
This objection cannot be so readily 
dismissed, however, if the investigator 
or members of the team of investigators 
include clinicians who have a prior 
therapeutic relationship with research 
participants, as in the experiment 
described earlier involving patients 
with irritable bowel syndrome [13]. 
When investigators simultaneously 
have both therapeutic and research 
roles, it is difﬁ  cult, if not impossible, 
to avoid the violation of medical 
ethics constituted by deception, even 
if adequate safeguards are in place to 
make the deception justiﬁ  able in the 
context of research. In addition, the 
potential for negative consequences 
to patients from deception is likely to 
be greater in this situation. It is not 
clear why it would be necessary for a 
clinician having a prior therapeutic 
relationship with participants to 
conduct valuable research on the 
placebo effect. For example, in the case 
of Vase et al.’s irritable bowel syndrome 
experiment, an experienced clinician 
would be needed to safely administer 
the rectal distention procedure; 
however, someone other than the 
treating physician could be recruited to 
perform this function.
Conclusion
Research aimed at elucidating the 
placebo effect promises to produce 
valuable knowledge concerning the 
psychological and neurobiological 
dimensions of healing. Insights 
gleaned from this research may 
contribute to the development of 
clinical interventions that can enhance 
the therapeutic efﬁ  cacy of existing 
treatments. Experiments investigating 
the placebo effect, however, evoke 
legitimate ethical concerns, owing to 
the use of deception. 
Key safeguards to assure the ethical 
design and conduct of deceptive 
placebo research include (1) prior 
review and approval by an independent 
research ethics committee to 
determine that the use of deception is 
methodologically necessary and that 
the study protocol offers sufﬁ  cient 
value to justify the risks it poses to 
participants, including the use of 
deception; (2) disclosure in the 
informed-consent document that the 
study involves the use of deception; and 
(3) debrieﬁ  ng of participants at the 
conclusion of research participation. 
To contribute to public accountability, 
articles reporting the results of research 
using deception should describe brieﬂ  y 
adherence with these participant-
protection guidelines [45,46]. As in all 
clinical research, an acceptable balance 
must be struck between promoting 
valuable knowledge and protecting the 
rights and well-being of participants.  
Supporting Information
Table S1. Clinical Studies on the Placebo 
Effect Involving Deception
Found at DOI: 10.1371/journal.
pmed.0020262.st001 (69 KB DOC). 
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